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The relative importance of social evolution theories such
as kin selection, direct reciprocity and need-based transfers
in explaining real-world cooperation is the source of much
debate. Previous field studies of cooperation in human
communities have revealed variability in the extent to
which each of these theories explains human sociality in
different contexts. We conducted multivariate social network
analyses predicting costly cooperation—labouring on another
household’s farm—in 128 082 dyads of Mosuo farming
households in southwest China. Through information-theoretic
model selection, we tested the roles played by genealogical
relatedness, affinal relationships (including reproductive
partners), reciprocity, relative need, wealth, household size,
spatial proximity and gift-giving in an economic game. The
best-fitting model included all factors, along with interactions
between relatedness and (i) reciprocity, (ii) need, (iii) the
presence of own children in another household and (iv)
proximity. Our results show how a real-world form of
cooperation was driven by kinship. Households tended
to help kin in need (but not needy non-kin) and travel
further to help spatially distant relatives. Households were
more likely to establish reciprocal relationships with distant
relatives and non-kin but closer kin cooperated regardless of
reciprocity. These patterns of kin-driven cooperation show the
importance of inclusive fitness in understanding human social
behaviour.
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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1. Introduction
Humans are highly social, and live in groups that cooperate extensively with interdependent kin and
non-kin. The variability and flexibility observed in cooperative strategies across communities of humans
throughout the world has led to a profusion of explanations for the evolution and maintenance of our
extreme social behaviour: some derived from models applicable to a wide variety of organisms; others
specific to us.
The inclusive fitness framework posits that social behaviour will be selected for when the indirect
fitness benefits, tempered by the proportion of shared genes, outweigh the direct fitness costs of that
behaviour (known as ‘Hamilton’s rule’: rb> c [1]). Typically, this can come about with the aid of
mechanisms—such as kin recognition and limited dispersal—that allow for assortment among genetic
relatives [2]. While such assortment can select for cooperation, under some circumstances such as shared
resources or limited mates, genetic relatives might also compete [3].
The importance of inclusive fitness explanations for our large-scale cooperation has been debated,
with some researchers emphasizing other evolutionary mechanisms such as direct reciprocity, need-
based transfers (NBTs), reputation-based partner choice, signalling and cultural group selection, over
and above kinship [4–8]. Here, we will investigate the roles played by relatedness, reciprocity and NBTs
in structuring decisions to engage in a costly form of cooperation for members of a farming community
in southwest China. (In this contribution, we define cooperation as a social behaviour that benefits the
fitness of another individual, without necessarily proving detrimental to the cooperator’s fitness [9].)
Beyond cooperation driven by shared ancestry, humans also recognize and work with extensive
networks of non-kin who are considered as family [10], including affines (spouses and in-laws) and
fictive kin (e.g. ‘brothers from another mother’, fatherlands and sisterhoods). Affinal kin, in particular,
might cooperate due to aligned reproductive interests in descendants [11]. Extending the status
of ‘family’ to friends and others expands social networks, forging deep ties of mutual obligation,
ameliorating social isolation and perhaps substituting for absent biological family [12–15].
Direct reciprocity (also known as reciprocal altruism [16]) is another evolutionary mechanism that
can promote cooperative strategies in populations. The canonical reciprocal strategies are tit-for-tat
(cooperate first, then copy your social partner’s actions) and win-stay, lose-shift (repeat the same action
if successful, otherwise change action) operating in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma situation [17,18]. For
human and non-human primates, at least, reciprocity can involve exchanges in the same commodity or
trade across domains of cooperation [19,20].
In contrast to forms of direct reciprocity that require an actor to track and respond to their history of
interactions with social partners, NBTs do not require memory or cognitive load. NBTs are initiated by the
(potential) recipient of a cooperative action; such transfers are free of obligations to repay (either in-kind,
entirely or even at all) and thus do not create debt bondage between social partners [21]. Theoretically,
NBTs allow risk-pooling, increase survival and decrease wealth inequality [22,23].
The theories of cooperation outlined above are not mutually exclusive. A meta-analysis of direct
reciprocity, kin selection and tolerated scrounging1 in 32 primate populations (including human forager
groups) found that, overall, reciprocity was the strongest predictor of food sharing, although its
effect was highly variable between societies and statistically indistinguishable from the positive effect
of kinship [20]. Similarly, a meta-analysis of non-human primate grooming behaviour found that
reciprocity was the relatively stronger predictor of cooperation compared to kin selection, although both
evolutionary mechanisms positively predicted grooming [24].
For humans, reciprocal partnerships can also emerge from the interplay between cultural norms of
widespread sharing, kinship relations and constraints (such as spatial distance between households).
A study of food sharing in Namibia, for example, found that specific reciprocal partnerships were
spurred on by differences in social partners (e.g. quality, kinship and proximity) that people had access
to via a norm of unconditional giving [25].
Field studies of cooperation in human societies have uncovered the sheer flexibility characteristic of
our species. Households cooperate in many ways, from farming, hunting and sharing food, through
to policing their communities and arranging marriages. Closer kin are often the preferred recipients
of help [26–31], especially relatives who are in need [32,33]. Indeed, several studies have shown the
importance of inclusive fitness in explaining costly forms of cooperation [33–37]. Kinship is not always
an important factor in cooperation [38,39], however, and might be more important for behaviour such
1The concept of tolerated scrounging includes transfers due to relative need and spatial proximity, as well as an inability to monopolize
resources due to pressure from solicitation or dominant individuals [20]. Here, we are concerned with the effects of need and proximity,
and separate them in our analyses rather than lumping them under a single umbrella term.
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Table 1. Predictions tested in this study. See main text for context.
hypothesis supported?
H1. Households will be more likely to help on a farm where closer kin live yes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H2. People will travel further to help closer kin yes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H3. People will be more likely to help kin who are relatively needier (measured as producer : consumer ratios) no
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H4. Households will engage in directly reciprocal relationships regardless of kinship no
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H5. Households will be more likely to help relatively less wealthy households no
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
as childcare rather than labouring or food sharing in some societies [19]. Therefore, we derive several
mutually inclusive predictions about cooperation among households in our study area (table 1). Given
the importance of kinship for cooperation in human communities, we predict that households will be
more likely to help households in which closer kin live (H1) and that people will travel further to help
closer kin (H2). In addition, people will be more likely to help kin who are relatively more needy (H3).
Reciprocal relationships between households might mitigate the risks of living in variable
environments [40]. Reciprocity can be the organizing principle for food transfers [32] and cooperative
hunting [41], among other domains of helping [27]. Labour exchange, such as through working on the
farms of other households—the form of cooperation we study here—might help create economies of
scale, where investment costs are reduced while output increases [42]. We thus expect that households in
our study villages will be more likely to engage in directly reciprocal relationships, even without kinship
(H4; table 1).
Households with relatively more consumers also tend to receive more help [26,27], although this is
not a universal pattern [40]. Regardless, larger, wealthier and/or more productive households might be
more likely to provide goods and services to others [40,43]. Therefore, we predict that households in our
study area will be more likely to help relatively less wealthy households (H5; table 1).
We extend the field studies reviewed above by investigating the evolutionarily salient factors
predicting a time-consuming and energetically costly form of cooperation (labouring on another
household’s farm). We also explicitly compare this real-world, costly cooperation to cost-free allocation
decisions in a gift game, as used in other studies of cooperation [29,44,45]. This paper will compare
the relative importance of four evolutionary mechanisms of cooperation—relatedness (genealogical and
affinal), reciprocity, need-based helping and rewards—in predicting costly cooperation in a farming
community from southwest China.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Study area
‘Mosuo’ refers to an ethnic group in rural southwest China, located around Lugu Lake on the
border of Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Mosuo (also known as Na) social life is typically organized
around matrilineal households in which family members spend most if not all their lives (duolocal
residence) [46].
Agriculture is a primary means of subsistence in this area. Members of different households come
together to help one another during planting and harvesting seasons; everybody works in the fields
during this time, regardless of gender or age. Households also cooperate in the construction of new
houses, share funeral costs if the deceased’s household cannot afford the ceremony, and jointly invest in
economic ventures [47].
The area has become an increasingly popular tourist spot, which has led to a number of Mosuo
households deviating from matrilineal norms due to a mixture of cultural diffusion and economic
motivations [48]. Many households on the Sichuan province side of the lake, the site of this study, follow
the duolocal Mosuo way of life, although tourism and more intermarriage with Han people are causing
this to shift [47,49].
Within the matrilineal families, all residents share the fruits of household labour. Sisters reproduce
communally. Older sisters invest more time in farm work and have correspondingly higher reproductive
success compared to their younger sisters [50]. (Note that rural ethnic minorities like the Mosuo people
have been allowed 2–3 children since the 1979 fertility policy.)
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In traditional Mosuo life, ‘marriage is rejected as an institution that disrupts household harmony’
[51, p. 487]. Harmonious relationships are the ideal between household members [47] and grandmothers
tend to be the heads of houses. Family members will eat and farm together, pool money and care for
children communally. Big families are preferred but households can fission if they become too large or if
relationships are riven by conflict [48]; however, fissions are seen as shameful and to be avoided [52].
One aspect of Mosuo culture is sese or zohoun (walking marriage). A man in a walking marriage will
visit his partner’s house during the night and return to his natal household at daybreak. Once a union
is publicly recognized, the male may eat with or give gifts to his partner’s family [47]. Since the 1980s,
formal marriage has been a requirement for reproduction for most people throughout China as part of
the government’s family planning policy, so the idea of conjugal partners has become more similar to
the Han norm if a child is involved, even when partners live apart. For simplicity, we use the terms
‘husband’ and ‘wife’ to refer to male and female zohoun and/or marriage partners identified as such in
the household surveys.
2.2. Data collection
All data collection was carried out by Jiajia Wu, Qiao-Qiao He and Ting Ji. Demographic surveys
were conducted in five villages in Sichuan province around Lugu Lake during 2012. One adult was
interviewed on behalf of all household members about details including name, age, sex, ethnic group,
names of spouses and parents. GPS locations were also captured for households. Pedigrees were created
by linking every person in the census to their mother and father.
In 2013, individuals were gathered together in groups in several public locations in the villages,
to have the games explained to them, and then the actual games were played one by one in private
in a nearby room. Participants played a gift game in which they gave gifts to individuals anywhere
in the study villages. Participants were endowed with 15 yuan, which they could give—in five yuan
denominations—to between one and three recipients; players were not allowed to keep any of their
endowments for themselves. We aggregated gift-giving at the household level.
Data on working in the fields was collected by moving from farm to farm during harvest or planting
season and recording the composition of workers on each farm. Spot observations of all those people
working on each farm (defined as those present on the field when we arrived) were conducted during
the planting seasons of 2011 and 2012 and the harvest season of 2012. Locations were randomly
sampled within the study villages, giving unbiased, although incomplete, coverage. Workers’ names
were collected and the names were linked to their records in our demographic database.
Wealth ranking of households was conducted by 1–3 senior people in each village. The fieldworkers
presented them with cards with the names of the heads of each household; they then divided the cards
into three piles: rich, medium and poor. The villagers further divided ‘medium’ into another four piles,
leaving a total of six piles of households: very rich (1) to very poor (6). The people who did the wealth
ranking were usually heads of that village who were familiar with every household. Note that wealth
ranks can only be interpreted within the context of each village—e.g. a household ranked 3 in village A
does not necessarily have equivalent wealth to a household ranked 3 in village B.
2.3. Data preparation
Relatedness between each pair of individuals was calculated from the pedigree data using a modified
version of PyPedal [53]. Relatedness between households was calculated as the mean relatedness
between each pair of individuals in the ego and alter households [28,32,54]. Note that we do not know
levels of paternity certainty but it seems not to be especially high: 20% of women had reported offspring
by more than one partner. Affinal networks were constructed based on the names and households of
individuals’ spouses and aggregated at the household level.
Distance in kilometres between households—a proxy for distance travelled to help, because fields are
normally fairly close to houses—within the same village was calculated from the longitude and latitude
GPS coordinates. Household size was calculated as the total number of people living there at the time of
the census. The three seasons of farm observations were aggregated by household.
Relative wealth ranking was calculated by subtracting ego’s rank from alter’s rank. Positive relative
rank means the household receiving help (alter) was poorer than the helping house (i.e. alter’s wealth
rank > ego’s rank). Larger differences in rank indicate greater wealth disparity.
Relative need was defined as the ratio of consumers to producers in a household [27,40]. ‘Consumers’
represents dependents: defined in this case as the number of children younger than the lowest recorded
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, stratified by village. ‘Distance’ refers to kilometres between households; ‘modal gifts’ and ‘modal help’
refer to themost commonnumber of gifts given between households andmost commonnumber of times amember fromone household
was observed helping on another’s farm. Note that the median number of gifts and amount of help given are also 1 for all villages.
village no. houses mean HH size s.d. HH size mean distance (km) s.d. distance (km) modal gifts modal help
A 120 7.000 3.007 0.996 0.694 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B 244 6.918 2.943 1.348 0.999 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C 131 6.969 2.572 1.438 1.027 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D 119 5.580 1.839 0.673 0.432 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E 156 5.045 1.776 0.705 0.540 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3. Breakdown of the number of dyads related at different intervals. Here we only count each ego–alter pair once so the counts
sum to 64 041 rather than 128 082.
relatedness no. dyads
[0,0.0039) 60 227
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.0039,0.0078) 542
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.0078,0.015) 622
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.015,0.031) 751
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.031,0.063) 914
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.063,0.125) 566
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.125,0.25) 388
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[0.25,0.5) 31
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
age at first birth in the population (15 years). Larger values of relative need means that there were more
dependent children per adult in a household.
Household dyads were limited to those occurring within the same village and include only those
headed by Mosuo people. Binary variables were coded as 1 for each household dyad if any member of
one household:
— was ever observed helping on the farm of another household (the response variable in our
analyses);
— gave a gift to any member of another household in the gift game;
— had any children (of any age, not just less than 15 years) in another household; and
— had a partner (somebody with whom they reproduced) residing in another household.
2.4. Statistical analysis
We fitted generalized estimating equations (GEEs) to investigate the importance of relatedness,
reciprocity, need and gifts in predicting whether any residents of a household (ego) ever worked on an
alter household’s farm. GEEs were specified with an exchangeable correlation matrix and observations
were clustered on the ego households. We used model selection on a candidate set of models representing
the hypotheses outlined in the Introduction (table 4). To select the best models, we compared the
quasi-likelihood under the independence model information criteria [55].
In order to allow comparison of coefficients within models, we standardized continuous parameter
estimates over 2 s.d. and mean-centred binary estimates [56]. Parameter estimates reported in the main
text are unstandardized log odds unless otherwise stated.
All analyses were conducted in R v. 3.3 [57].
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Figure 1. Histogramof relative need in eachhousehold (number of dependent children : number of adults). Therewere sevenhouseholds
containing more children less than 15 years than adults (relative need greater than 1). Relative need of zero means the number of
dependent children and the number of adults is balanced.
3. Results
There were 770 households across the five study villages, forming 128 082 dyads (table 2). The number
of dyads was derived from summing the total number of within-village dyads: n × (n− 1), where n is
the number of houses in a village. Note this totals 128 824 before excluding 742 dyads with missing data.
Table 3 and figure 1 show the distributions of between-household relatedness and within-household
relative need; figure 2 shows correlations between variables).
The best-fitting model predicting help on another household’s farm contained all four mechanisms
of cooperation: relatedness; reciprocated help; relative need; and gifts (table 4). For ease of comparing
effect sizes for continuous and binary predictors within the best-fitting model, we present odds ratios
with 95% confidence intervals standardized over 2 s.d. in figure 3 (see Materials and methods); for ease
of real-world interpretation, we present unstandardized log odds in the main text.
Closer relatedness between households strongly predicted an increased likelihood of farm help
(log odds= 19.528; 95% CI [16.708, 22.348]; figures 3 and 4), supporting H1. Households were more
likely to help one another if children (of any age, not just less than 15 years) of any member of one
household resided in the other (log odds= 1.905; 95% CI [0.918, 2.891]). However, the negative interaction
between child presence and between-household relatedness (log odds=−13.689; 95% CI [−19.029,
−8.349]) means that help was less likely as relatedness increased when children lived in the landowning
households (figure 4a). Therefore, farm labour might act as a form of parental investment when children
do not live with other people who are related to the helper(s).
Help was given to closer neighbours (i.e. distance had a strong negative effect: log odds=−0.886;
95% CI [−1.136, −0.636]). The interaction between distance and relatedness had a positive effect (log
odds= 6.598; 95% CI [3.95, 9.246]), meaning the people were willing to travel further to help relatives,
supporting H2 (figure 4e).
Households with a higher relative need—that is, a higher ratio of consumers (children under 15
years) to producers—were not less likely to give help (log odds=−0.206; 95% CI [−0.561, 0.149]) but
were less likely to receive help (log odds=−0.767; 95% CI [−1.153, −0.38]). Although the interactions
between relatedness and relative need appeared in the best model, it had a small, uncertain effect on the
probability of farm labour and did not support H3 (figure 4d). Households were more likely to labour
on the farms of households that reciprocated the help, unless they were closely related, opposing H4
(figure 4b). Households were slightly more likely to help on the farms of households they had given gifts
to (log odds= 0.649; 95% CI [0.241, 1.058]), although the effect is small (figure 4c).
Farm help was more likely if there was at least one female reproductive partner (log odds= 1.18;
95% CI [0.417, 1.943]) or male reproductive partner (log odds= 1.367; 95% CI [0.823, 1.911]) present
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Figure 2. Bivariate correlations between predictor variables and the response variable (help observed). Numbers within the cells are
Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Blue cells are statistically significant (p< 0.05), with darker shades as p approaches zero; white cells
are borderline statistically significant; red and grey cells are not statistically significant.
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Figure3. Odds ratios fromthebest-fittinggeneralizedestimatingequationpredicting farm labour (table 4). Estimateswere standardized
over 2 s.d. to allow comparison between continuous and binary predictors [56]. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Intercept
(OR= 0.002 [0.001, 0.002]) not shown for clarity.
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Table4. Candidate set of generalized estimating equations (GEEs) predicting farm labour in dyads of households (ego–alter pairs)within
villages. All models except the intercept-only one controlled for distance between ego and alter households, the number of people
living in each household, and their relative wealth rank. ‘Relatedness’ models also include terms for relatedness× distance between
households, the presence of partners and children in alter households, and an interaction between relatedness and the presence of
children in alter households. SeeMaterial andmethods for details about the operationalization of other predictors. The best-fittingmodel
(bold) is analysed in the main text.
model log-likelihood QIC weight
relatedness× relative need+ relatedness× reciprocity+ gifts −2593.817 0.000 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness× relative need+ reciprocity+ gifts −2618.853 47.498 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ reciprocity+ relative need+ gifts −2620.735 47.627 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ reciprocity+ relative need −2627.013 57.873 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ reciprocity −2632.840 64.050 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ relative need+ gifts −2664.148 125.778 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ gifts −2670.361 133.036 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness+ relative need −2671.040 137.701 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relatedness −2676.891 144.163 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
reciprocated help −3103.617 978.718 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
gifts −3222.550 1214.000 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
relative need −3306.860 1381.411 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
control model (distance+ HH size+ relative wealth) −3314.098 1392.992 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept-only −3557.519 1865.631 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in the alter household. Larger households were more likely to receive help (log odds= 0.147; 95% CI
[0.114, 0.179]) and give help (log odds= 0.093; 95% CI [0.056, 0.13]). Increasing relative wealth rank was
associated with a lower probability of helping (log odds=−0.056; 95% CI [−0.107,−0.004]), meaning that
wealthier households were less likely to help poorer households (positive relative rank), not supporting
H5, whereas poorer households were more likely to help richer households (negative relative rank).
4. Discussion
Our results show the relative importance of genealogical kin for structuring a costly measure of real-
world cooperation—labouring on farms—compared to other evolutionarily important mechanisms of
cooperation, such as reciprocity and NBTs. Kinship was the strongest positive predictor of farm labour
in the study villages. Farm help was likely to have been reciprocated, except if the help was provided by
closely related households; closer kin cooperate regardless of reciprocity.
Affinal relationships were also positive predictors of cooperation, as observed elsewhere [27,35]:
people were more likely to help on the farms of households containing their sexual partners. The
presence of children in another household was associated with a higher likelihood of helping on
that household’s farm. (Note that we defined ‘children’ in this case as offspring of any age, not just
dependents.)
Cooperation was somewhat constrained by spatial distance, meaning that households were more
likely to help their neighbours: a pattern observed in other societies [19,25,27,28]. However, people were
more likely to travel further to help relatives. Contrary to predictions, poorer households were not more
likely to receive help. Similarly, households with greater need (i.e. a higher proportion of consumers to
producers) were less likely to receive help on their farms, except from kin.
Gift-giving in an economic game positively predicted observed farm labour. Allocation decisions
in gift games have become popular as a simple proxy of cooperation or to reveal underlying social
relationships [29,44,45]. By comparing game behaviour to observations of a salient and costly form of
cooperation, our results suggest that this form of economic game has external validity and can be an
appropriate measure of cooperation.
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of farm labour for household dyads within the same village. All panels show the combined effect of
relatedness between households (x axes) and (a) whether or not the helping (ego) household has any children present in alter; (b)
whether or not alter helped on ego’s farm; (c) whether or not ego gave alter gifts; (d) alter’s relative need (no need= 0, medium
need= 1, high need= 2); (e) spatial distance between ego and alter (for close neighbours, distance= 0 km; mean distance= 1.130
km; furthest= 5.310 km). All other predictors were set to the population mean values.
Labouring on another household’s farm—the costly form of cooperation investigated here—could
potentially act as a form of investment in future reproduction. Labour exchange might also occur due
to ‘competitive altruism’, where individuals who are better cooperators, or have the reputation of being
a better cooperative partner, become preferred social or reproductive partners [58]. Increased helping
for richer households may be an immediate response to being well fed while helping, or to keeping
on good terms with more affluent and influential families, including for seeking future mates or allies.
A study of labour exchange in Dominica found that men working more often had greater reputations for
altruism and were, in turn, chosen more often as cooperative partners, although their reputation was not
associated with mating success [59]. People living in the same hamlets tended to exchange labour with
one another, suggesting a similar spatially constrained pattern of cooperation as in this study.
The lack of helping for those in need is in contrast with some findings from pastoralist societies [23]
and from hunter–gatherers [60]. It may be that poverty in farming communities is more strongly related
to long-term variables such as the size or quality of land owned, which is less likely to fluctuate in the
way that pastoralists’ herds or foragers’ needs can do in response to ecological uncertainty. Therefore,
poverty in a farmer may be more persistent and not of the type that will generate reciprocal altruism
(which is predicted to be more likely when both poor and rich live in fear that they may one day be the
one that is in need). Alternatively, the duolocal residence system, which we have shown elsewhere to
be associated with relatively low levels of between-household cooperation compared to other residence
systems in the region [61], may simply reduce between-household cooperation. Formal affinal links with
other households can be weaker than in groups where one sex disperses.
This paper only investigated one kind of non-kin relationship: mating partners; future work could
begin to explore the importance of other non-kin relationships such as ritual partners and friendships
[35,62,63]. We have shown in a companion paper [64] that a reputation for supposedly being a ‘poison
 on March 19, 2018http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
10
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.5:171535
................................................
giver’, predicts less help from those not so labelled, but more help from those that share this harmful
label. Reputation in some domains is clearly important in structuring patterns of help. However, we
showed that that particular tag does not correlate with cooperativeness in an economic game [64], so its
origins and function are unclear. Furthermore, the cultural tag correlated slightly positively with wealth,
not negatively, so assortment on the tag is not likely to explain why those apparently in most need got
less help.
This study has a few limitations. We conducted correlational analyses of cross-sectional and sparse
data on farm help and behaviour in an economic game. Future work should investigate the longitudinal
dynamics of cooperation, especially the processes underlying the formation of reciprocal helping
relationships and other ties in Mosuo social networks. It would also be interesting to examine if and how
cooperation changes in response to changes in household need over time (e.g. as dependent children
grow up and become producers), as well as the links between individual differences in cooperative
behaviour rather than just cooperation aggregated at the household level. Future studies could also
explore cooperation across domains other than labour, such as childcare or food production [19].
Theoretical models of kin selection generalize the concept of relatedness beyond shared ancestry
(pedigree or genealogical relatedness) to include all forms of assortment on genotype [65]. This redefines
relatedness as a statistical concept capturing the idea that any two individuals might be less or more
related to one another than either is to their local group, potentially allowing for negative values of
relatedness [66]. Empirical studies, on the other hand, tend to operationalize relatedness as Wright’s
coefficient, derived from genealogical data. One potential avenue for future conciliation between these
approaches could be to take advantage of ever-cheaper DNA sequencing technology to empirically test
for differences in the explanatory power of genealogical relatives and genetic relatives without shared
ancestry in predicting cooperative behaviour and reproductive success.
Our work supports the idea that there appears to be something ‘special’ about relatedness through
shared ancestry compared to sharing alleles at particular loci for other reasons. Identity-by-descent
can be important because genealogical relatives are equally related across the whole genome (more or
less), allowing adaptations fuelled by multiple interacting genes to evolve [67]. In addition, our results
highlight the efficacy of the classical formulation of Hamilton’s rule for explaining cooperation in human
populations.
We have shown that cooperation is predominantly, though not exclusively, structured around kinship
relations in a rural farming community in southwest China. Thus, our results speak to the importance of
understanding human cooperation through the lens of inclusive fitness.
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